

## Homework 15: Chapter 14

1. Suppose there are four bidders  $A, B, C$ , and  $D$  with bids

$$a = 20 \quad b = 16 \quad c = 4 \quad d = 8$$

and **A is the winning bidder**.

- (a) Find  $q$  for this compensation arrangement.  
 (b) What is the equitable compensation arrangement?  
 (c) Consider instead the following compensation arrangement:

$$B \text{ wins, pays out } x_A = 5, x_C = 3, x_D = 5.$$

Construct the envy-table for this compensation arrangement. Find all instances of envy.

*Solution.* (a) Using the formula  $q = \frac{w}{S}$ ,

$$q = \frac{w}{S} = \frac{20}{20 + 16 + 4 + 8} = \frac{5}{5 + 4 + 1 + 2} = \frac{5}{12}$$

- (b) The equitable compensation arrangement is determined by what  $A$  pays to  $B$ ,  $C$ , and  $D$ :

$$\begin{aligned} x_B = qb &= \frac{5}{12} \times 16 = \frac{5 \times 4}{3} = \frac{20}{3} \\ x_C = qc &= \frac{5}{3} \\ x_D = qd &= \frac{10}{3} \end{aligned}$$

- (c) We know what everyone thinks  $A$ ,  $C$ , and  $D$  are getting. The only ambiguity is the net gain to  $B$  for getting the object.

	$A$	$B$	$C$	$D$	gets
$A$	5	7	3	5	
$B$	5	3	3	5	
$C$	5	-9	3	5	
$D$	5	-5	3	5	
thinks					

- $A$  envies  $B$
- $B$  envies  $A$  and  $D$
- $C$  envies  $A$  and  $D$
- $D$  has no envy.

□

2. Prove: if the winning bidder  $A$  is a highest bidder and  $B, C$  are the only other bidders, then the compensation arrangement

$$x_B = \frac{a}{3} \quad x_C = \frac{a}{3}$$

is envy-free.

*Proof.* First, let's show  $A$  doesn't have envy.  $A$  thinks everyone else ( $B$  and  $C$ ) gets  $a/3$ . Actually,  $A$  thinks  $A$  gets  $a/3$  also:

$$x_A = a - \frac{a}{3} - \frac{a}{3} = a - \frac{2a}{3} = \frac{a}{3}$$

so  $A$  does not envy anyone.

Also,  $B$  and  $C$  literally get the same thing, so they don't envy each other. And (for example)  $B$  doesn't envy  $A$  because  $\boxed{b \leq a}$ , by assumption that  $A$  is a highest bidder, so

$$BtAg = b - \frac{a}{3} - \frac{a}{3} \leq a - \frac{2a}{3} = \frac{a}{3} = BtBg$$

and  $B$  doesn't envy  $A$  by definition.

The same argument is true for  $C$ , so we conclude that neither  $B$  nor  $C$  has any envy, and the compensation arrangement is envy-free.

□

**Remark.** Question 2 completes the proof of Our Proposition: An envy-free compensation arrangement is possible if and only if the winning bidder is a highest bidder.